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STATE, AND THE FUTURE OF 
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ABSTRACT  
  The future of nondelegation is uncertain. Long considered an 
“axiom in constitutional law,” the nondelegation principle has almost 
never been seriously enforced—from the founding of the country to 
present day. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy v. United 
States, that truism may soon change.  
  For much of its recent history, the Court has approached 
nondelegation challenges using the “intelligible principle” test. Now, 
for the first time in many years, five Justices have indicated a 
willingness to revisit that test. In his dissenting opinion in Gundy, 
Justice Gorsuch proposed a new test—the “Gorsuch test”—for 
adjudicating nondelegation disputes. He averred that a legislature can 
only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill up the details”; 
(2) to make the application of a rule dependent on certain executive 
fact-finding; or (3) to assign nonlegislative responsibilities to either the 
judicial or executive branch.  
  This Note is among the first scholarly pieces to examine the Gorsuch 
test and its potential implications for administrative law. By tracing 
previous nondelegation tests and proposals, this Note argues that 
Justice Gorsuch’s proposal would severely curtail Congress’s ability to 
transfer authority efficiently, limit the administrative state, imperil 
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potentially hundreds of thousands of statutes, cause doctrinal 
confusion, and force a change that will be difficult to apply. Ultimately, 
the Court should not adopt this proposal and instead continue to apply 
the decades-old intelligible principle test.  
INTRODUCTION  
Article I, § 1 of the Constitution vests legislative power in 
Congress.1 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to bar 
congressional delegations of power to any other branch of 
government.2 The nondelegation doctrine is “an axiom in 
constitutional law . . . universally recognized as a principle essential to 
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained 
by the Constitution.”3 However, although nondelegation has been 
“universally recognized,” it has gone almost universally unenforced.4  
For much of its recent history, the Court has analyzed 
nondelegation claims using the “intelligible principle” test established 
in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States.5 So long as Congress laid 
down “an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized 
. . . is directed to conform,” the delegation passed constitutional 
muster.6 Apart from two instances in 1935, no act of Congress has ever 
been struck down as violating this principle.7  
On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court handed down a fractured 
opinion in its nondelegation jurisprudence: Gundy v. United States.8 
After hearing arguments in Gundy with only eight members (Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh had yet to be confirmed), the Court ruled on the 
 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).  
 2.  Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 697 (1892) (Lamar, J., concurring) (“[N]o part of this 
legislative power can be delegated by Congress to any other department of the government, 
executive or judicial. . . .”).  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001) 
(“It is, after all, a commonplace that the nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at all.”).  
 5.  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).  
 6.  Id. at 409. 
 7.  See Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (“[I]n every case in which the 
question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there 
is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that [this case] goes beyond those limits.”); 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (“We think that the . . . 
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (remarking that the 
nondelegation doctrine “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting)”). 
 8.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).  
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merits nine months later.9 Justice Elena Kagan wrote the plurality 
opinion and applied the traditional intelligible principle test to find the 
disputed statute constitutionally sound.10 But, strikingly, for the first 
time since 1935, four Justices expressed a willingness to revisit a 
doctrine that had been undisturbed for over eighty years. Justice Neil 
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice John 
Roberts, dissented and proposed a new test for approaching 
nondelegation challenges.11 Justice Gorsuch averred that the 
legislature could only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill 
up the details”; (2) to make the application of a rule dependent on 
certain executive fact-finding; or (3) to assign nonlegislative 
responsibilities to either the judicial or executive branch.12 The three 
prongs of his analysis formed the new “Gorsuch test.”13  
Justice Samuel Alito provided the fifth vote to uphold the statute 
but wrote separately, noting that the Court has permitted 
“extraordinarily capacious standards” in the past.14 At the same time, 
he stated an openness to reconsidering the intelligible principle test if 
a majority of the Court would vote in its favor.15 Otherwise, it would 
be odd to single out this statute for lacking a discernable standard.16  
Thus, the future of the doctrine seems to rest with Justice 
Kavanaugh, who tipped his hand in the early October 2019 term. In 
response to the same nondelegation statutory challenge raised in 
Gundy, Justice Kavanaugh agreed that “Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly 
analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation in his Gundy dissent may 
warrant further consideration in future cases.”17 The Court, he 
 
 9.  Id. at 2116. On October 6, 2018, four days after Gundy was argued, Justice Brett 
Kavanagh joined the Court, cementing a five-Justice conservative majority. John Bresnahan & 
Burgess Evertett, Kavanaugh Wins Confirmation to the Supreme Court, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2018, 
3:14 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/06/kavanaugh-confirmation-vote-877357 
[https://perma.cc/6RTY-LVSC]. 
 10.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2118, 2129. 
 11.  Id. at 2131, 2136–37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 12.  Id. at 2136–37.  
 13.  Given the lack of scholarly work on this topic, this Note creates the phrase “the Gorsuch 
test.”  
 14.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 15.  See id. at 2131 (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we 
have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”). 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.). In the October 2018 term, 
Justice Kavanaugh joined the conservative Justices in many high-profile cases, including joining 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in another major administrative law case, Kisor v. Wilkie, 
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In Kisor, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with 
HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2020  5:16 PM 
178  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:175 
declared, must ensure that “major national policy decisions [are] made 
by Congress,” not the executive branch.18  
Although observers should always be wary of prognostication on 
how a Justice might vote, it seems possible—if not likely—that there 
will be five votes to strike down broad delegations of power and apply 
some version of the Gorsuch test. If the Court chooses to adopt a 
stricter nondelegation test, it could imperil an estimated three hundred 
thousand rules that resemble the standard disputed in Gundy.19 These 
laws touch upon much of one’s daily life. They affect road safety, 
federal buildings, consumer finance, complex securities laws, banking, 
air travel, credit card transactions, and commercial trade, just to name 
a few areas.20  
The scholarship on nondelegation is voluminous.21 Even a 
unanimous nondelegation case prompts a bevy of articles on its 
holding, rationale, and impact.22 Given the split on the issue, the 
importance of understanding Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent is 
paramount. At the very least, the dissent showcases a willingness to 
 
Justice Gorsuch that the Court should no longer apply Auer deference, despite precedent doing 
so for almost eighty years and a recent Justice Scalia opinion upholding the deference. Id. at 2448.  
 18.  Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342.  
 19.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Oral Argument] (“[W]e’re told in one of the briefs that there are 300,000 such 
regulations [made pursuant to capacious standards] . . . . So which, in fact, fall, as you said, within 
your specially harsh rule? All of the 300,000? We’ll be busy in this Court for quite a while.”).  
 20.  See infra notes 251–55 and accompanying text (providing examples of broad delegations 
to executive agencies).  
 21.  See generally Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147 (2017) (calling for a “realignment” 
of the nondelegation doctrine that changes “the focus from the scope to the nature of the authority 
legally assigned”); Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet—Or Never Born? The Reality 
of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUD. 41 (2018) (examining the importance of the 
nondelegation doctrine prior to 1940 and describing “the historical shift from the enforcement of 
the nondelegation doctrine to the accommodation of legislative delegation to the executive”); 
Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 379 (2017) (arguing that “[t]here was no golden age in which the courts enforced a robust 
nondelegation doctrine” and “the federal courts never posed a significant obstacle to the 
development of the administrative state and the delegation of extensive policymaking 
authority”).  
 22.  For an example, consider the scholarship following Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452 (2002) (noting that the 
American Trucking case “brings the unanswered question to center stage: Should courts use 
constitutional law or administrative law for requiring administrative standards?”); Gary Lawson, 
Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005) (criticizing the American Trucking decision for treating the 
nondelegation doctrine “as a nullity”).  
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reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. Quite possibly, it provides the 
method the Court will use to do so. This Note is one of the first 
academic pieces to examine the evolution of nondelegation tests and 
situate the Gorsuch test within the doctrine.23 It argues that the 
Gorsuch test is stricter than any prior version and, if adopted, would 
severely curtail Congress’s ability to give agencies power, thus limiting 
the administrative state.  
Part I outlines the case law and reviews past proposals for a 
narrower nondelegation test than the intelligible principle test, 
emphasizing that even as the administrative state grew exponentially, 
no Court ever rigorously enforced the nondelegation principle. Part II 
introduces the disputed statute in Gundy, the factual circumstances 
underlying the case, the debates in the briefs and at oral argument, and 
the three fractured opinions. The case’s history reveals that neither the 
Court nor the parties significantly considered adopting a new test for 
the nondelegation doctrine. Part III examines Justice Gorsuch’s 
proposal in relation to previous tests and case law. Part IV considers 
the weaknesses of the Gorsuch test, analyzing its destabilizing effects 
on other broad statutes, the lack of doctrinal clarity, and difficult 
 
 23.  When work began on this Note in the fall of 2019, no paper had been published on the 
Gundy opinion. As expected, interest has grown. The scholarly work, however, is still in its 
infancy. Only a few pieces have addressed Gundy significantly. See generally William D. Araiza, 
Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could Like, 3 AM. CONST. SOC’Y 
SUP. CT. REV. 211 (2020) (arguing in favor of a stricter nondelegation doctrine as a means to 
advance progressive policies); Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: 
Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164 
(2019) (discussing the statutory interpretation involved and the relationship between Gundy and 
Kisor); Gary Lawson, I’m Leavin’ It (All) up to You: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of the 
Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018–2019  CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2018–2019) (focusing on the future 
of nondelegation with Justice Kavanaugh on the Court and the doctrine of subdelegation); Wayne 
A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunning for the Administrative State, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
185 (2019) (advocating for a more stringent nondelegation doctrine for delegations of criminal 
justice authority); Jennifer L. Mascott, Gundy v. United States: Reflections on the Court and the 
State of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2018) (writing before the release 
of the Court’s opinion to explain how the Justices viewed the nondelegation doctrine); Julian 
Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512154 [https://perma.cc/4BGA-N5SK] (taking a 
comprehensive view on the nondelegation doctrine after noting Justice Gorsuch’s reliance on it 
in Gundy); Jenny Roberts, Gundy and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 
(2019) (assessing the difference between nondelegation in the criminal and civil context after 
Gundy). No academic article significantly discusses the Gorsuch test within nondelegation case 
law or its implications. This Note contributes to the scholarship by framing the history of 
nondelegation by tests. It also argues that Justice Gorsuch’s proposal not only seeks to revitalize 
the nondelegation principle but also represents a stringent formulation compared to earlier tests, 
both actual and proposed. Finally, it outlines why this move may be unwise and destabilizing.  
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applications of the proposal. Ultimately, this Note concludes that these 
weaknesses—destabilization, obscurity, and unmanageability—
caution against the test’s adoption.  
I.  NONDELEGATION TESTS 
Until the late Gilded Age, the Court rarely invoked the 
nondelegation doctrine. Even then, the Court never struck down a 
statute until the Great Depression, doing so in only one year.24 For 
much of its history, the Court employed different phrasing while 
approaching nondelegation challenges, first using a “fill up the details” 
standard before settling on the intelligible principle test. Irrespective 
of the test’s exact wording, the result was the same: upholding the 
statute.25 Proponents of a stricter doctrine have proposed new tests, but 
these proposals have never gained traction.  
A. “Fill Up the Details” 
The First and Second Congresses delegated often, forcing courts 
to confront nondelegation challenges early in American legal history.26 
 
 24.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 25.  This Note does not attempt a historical gloss analysis of the nondelegation doctrine, but 
the relationship between that recently blossoming area of scholarship and this age-old question 
deserves more attention. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss 
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (outlining four general points about 
historical gloss: (1) the role of historical practice in the separation of powers context; (2) 
institutional acquiescence; (3) the difference between executive and legislative acquiescence; and 
(4) the institutional context in any given area where the question arises). Specifically, Professors 
Curt Bradley and Neil Siegel identified three conditions for gloss: “(1) governmental practice; (2) 
longstanding duration; and (3) acquiescence, which we interpret below as requiring at least 
reasonable stability in the practice but not necessarily inter-branch constitutional agreement.” 
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and Originalism 
Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2020). All three conditions seem present in the nondelegation 
context. The practice of delegating power—or transferring it—is a governmental practice that has 
continued for over two hundred years. Moreover, both branches have apparently accepted the 
practice without issue. This idea finds further support in the justifications for gloss, namely: (1) 
“deference to nonjudicial actors”; (2) limits on judicial capacity; (3) “Burkean consequentialism” 
(the realities of governance); and (4) “reliance interests.” Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 59, 64–67 (2017). A similar point applies to liquidation, “which would allow post-
Founding historical practice to resolve indeterminacies in the Constitution’s original meaning and 
thereby ‘fix’ its meaning.” Bradley & Siegel, supra, at 39. Again, the long-standing practice of 
allowing Congress to delegate with broad standards, dating back to the Founding, favors 
continuing to allow them to do so.  
 26.  See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738–39 
(1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (“[T]he 
early history of the republic furnishes scant support for vigorous enforcement of a nondelegation 
doctrine.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. 
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Almost immediately after ratification, Congress created the 
Departments of Treasury, War, and State; the Post Office; and a system 
of patent approvals entrusted to different departments.27 Early statutes 
showcased broad delegations to enact rules or exercise wide discretion. 
One law authorized military pensions “under such regulations as the 
President of the United States may direct.”28 On a later occasion, 
Congress granted the president the power to actually fix pay for all 
those wounded or disabled in battle, provided it was not more than a 
set maximum amount.29 
Eventually, one of these broad delegations was challenged, and 
the Supreme Court decided the first nondelegation challenge, Cargo of 
the Brig Aurora v. United States,30 in 1813.31 Three years prior, Congress 
 
L. REV. 1721, 1735–36 (2002) (listing a series of delegation statutes enacted by the First and 
Second Congresses). Originalist support for nondelegation is fiercely debated. See, e.g., ROBERT 
H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 92–93 (1941) (asserting that the 
Constitution contemplated a large measure of delegation); Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 719 (2019) (“I argue that the Nondelegation Doctrine has a firm 
foundation in the Constitution’s original meaning.”); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original 
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002) (“There is something very fundamental—indeed, almost 
primal—about the nondelegation doctrine that keeps resuscitating it when any rational observer 
would have issued a ‘code blue’ long ago.”); Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 1722 (“The 
nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard 
originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory.”); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 322 
(“The Constitution does grant legislative power to Congress, but it does not in terms forbid 
delegations of that power, and I have been unable to find any indication, in the founding era, that 
such delegations were originally thought to be banned.”). The actual Vesting Clause of Article I, 
§ 1 does not prohibit delegation, and the concept of delegation was barely mentioned in the 
Constitutional Convention, the Ratification debates, The Federalist Papers, and early 
governmental practices. See Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 1732–36 (discussing the lack of 
historical support for the nondelegation doctrine); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives.”). This Note, however, focuses on the evolution of the 
nondelegation doctrine, leaving aside this robust scholarly debate. 
 27.  JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (2012).  
 28.  An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, ch. 24, 
1 Stat. 95 (1789).  
 29.   Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 719 (1969) 
(“[T]he President [can] fix the pay, not more than prescribed maxima, for military personnel 
wounded or disabled in the line of duty.”); see also An Act for Regulating the Military 
Establishment of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (1790) (providing that wounded 
military personnel “shall be placed on the list of the invalids of the United States, at such rate of 
pay, and under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States . . . .”).  
 30.  Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States (The Brig Aurora), 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 
(1813). 
 31.  Id. at 382. Compare Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (presenting The Brig Aurora as a nondelegation case), and Keith E. Whittington, 
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passed a law permitting the president to lift an embargo if France or 
Britain ceased violating American neutral commerce.32 The owner of 
the ship argued that Congress “could not transfer the legislative power 
to the President,” as it would give the proclamation “the force of a 
law.”33 Congress could not have intended this result.34 The opposing 
attorney rejected that contention, arguing the president could only 
determine the facts “upon which the law should go into effect.”35 
Justice William Johnson delivered the opinion, which never mentioned 
the word “delegation,” the Vesting Clause, the president, or the 
separation of powers.36 Rather, the Court approved Congress’s 
exercise of discretion to revive the act “either expressly or 
conditionally, as their judgment should direct.”37  
The Court, under Chief Justice John Marshall, addressed 
nondelegation in Wayman v. Southard,38 thirty-eight years after the 
Constitution’s ratification. At issue was the Process Act, which 
required federal courts to adopt state procedure while also permitting 
“such alterations and additions as the said Courts respectively shall, in 
their discretion . . . think proper.”39 The defendant objected to the 
practice as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority that Congress 
“has not the power to make.”40 Marshall agreed that Congress could 
not delegate “exclusively” legislative power, but it could “delegate to 
others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”41 He 
wrote: 
  The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature 
itself from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be 
 
Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1291 (2009) (arguing that the 
Marshall Court upheld the challenged provision as not a “prohibited delegation”), with Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1737 (arguing that The Brig Aurora does not stand for the 
nondelegation principle).  
 32.  The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 383–84. 
 33.  Id. at 386. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 387.  
 36.  See id. at 388 (devoting only one paragraph to upholding the act by finding the law was 
not “without limitation”).  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).  
 39.  Id. at 41.  
 40.  Id. at 42.  
 41.  Id. at 43.  
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made, and power given to those who are to act under such general 
provisions to fill up the details.42 
Therefore, the Court needed to inquire into the extent of the 
powers given to the recipients by the law itself. The Process Act, the 
Court concluded, posed no constitutional issue.43  
Despite the dozens of times the issue was raised, no litigant 
successfully prevailed on a nondelegation challenge at the state level 
until the mid-nineteenth century or at the federal level until almost the 
mid-twentieth century.44 In the interim, the American administrative 
state ballooned. In 1887, Congress created the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the first independent agency of its kind.45 Within the next 
few decades, it also established the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.46 By the Great 
Depression, it had created larger agencies, such as the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.47 In response, the Supreme 
Court faced an increasing number of nondelegation cases beginning at 
the end of the nineteenth century and continuing to present day.  
In 1892, almost eighty years after Wayman,48 the Supreme Court 
considered the nondelegation issue again in Field v. Clark.49 The 
Marshall Field & Company challenged the authority conferred to the 
president under § 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890.50 Under the act, the 
president could suspend the tariffs of certain countries if the trading 
 
 42.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 43.  Posner and Vermeule observe that “[m]odern commentators have sometimes read the 
last sentence of this passage as though Marshall were attempting a turgid explication of the 
‘intelligible principle’ test.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1738. They disagree and argue 
that Marshall’s quote was never intended to become any form of the intelligible principle test. Id. 
at 1738–39. Rather, Marshall was simply drawing a line between exclusive powers and delegable 
powers. Id. If their reading is accurate, then neither the intelligible principle nor the Gorsuch test 
would be needed in adjudicating nondelegation challenges. It would instead only require a simple, 
formalist application.  
 44.  See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 21, at 419 (comparing all nondelegation cases 
from 1825 to 1940, with all unconstitutional delegation findings over the same period). 
 45.  Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41.  
 46.  Id. at 42. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 21, at 396 (“The Court had remarkably little to 
say regarding the delegation of legislative power from the late Marshall Court through the 
remainder of the nineteenth century.”).  
 49.  Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).  
 50.  Id. at 650–51.  
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country agreed to some reciprocal trade agreement.51 Attorneys for 
Marshall Field argued that the ability to tax was inherently legislative, 
pursuant to the Taxing Clause of Article I.52 Rejecting the argument, 
the Court noted that Congress, not the president, chose to tax the 
products.53 All the president could do was make the factual 
determination on whether a trade agreement rendered the tariffs 
unequal.54 Congress needed discretion and efficiency to legislate, and 
hundreds of laws on the books reflected this truism. When the opinion 
was handed down, Field was the Court’s clearest articulation of the 
nondelegation principle. Far from the oblique reference in The Brig 
Aurora or the esoteric line drawing in Wayman, the opinion clearly 
stated that Congress could not delegate “legislative power” and, 
moreover, that the nondelegation principle was “vital to the integrity 
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the 
Constitution.”55  
However, Field’s robust elaboration of nondelegation had no 
practical effect on the outcome of nondelegation challenges, as the 
Court only occasionally used some form of the “fill up the details” 
approach when deciding nondelegation disputes. In such disputes, the 
Court found that the ability of the secretary of the treasury to control 
certain imports was “proper” because it entailed only “[t]he delegation 
of details.”56 Similarly, it considered the authority granted to the 
Internal Revenue Service commissioner to create stamps for margarine 
packages and to the secretary of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to 
inspect mines as a mere “matter of detail.”57 And it found that a law 
allowing the secretary of agriculture to “establish[] certain rules for the 
purpose of regulating the use and occupancy of the public forest” 
amounted to filling in “administrative detail[s].”58  
 
 51.  Id. at 680.  
 52.  Id. at 695.  
 53.  Id. at 693 (“What the President was required to do was simply in execution of the act of 
Congress.”).  
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 692.  
 56.  Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 489 (1904).  
 57.  In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1897) (“[T]he designation by the Commissioner of the 
particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail.”); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. 
v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 211 (1902) (“It is obviously necessary that the number of inspections per 
year shall be determined by . . . some executive officer[,] [a]s it is clearly a matter of detail . . . .”). 
 58.  United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509, 516 (1911).  
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B. “Intelligible Principle” 
The Supreme Court’s adherence to any form of a “fill up the 
details” standard was short-lived. Even before the Court announced 
the intelligible principle test, earlier cases released contemporaneously 
with “fill up the details” cases forecasted a change in approach with 
broad phrases, such as “general rule.”59 Congress gave the Interstate 
Commerce Commission authority to regulate commerce by conducting 
reports, setting up a uniform system of accounts, and prohibiting 
methods of accounting as the Commission deemed fit.60 In Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,61 the Court believed 
that the statute was not a delegation of legislative authority, finding 
instead that the statute provided “general rules for . . . guidance.”62 
Similarly, the Court upheld an Ohio act that assigned an administrative 
body the “power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the 
policy and principles apply.”63 So long as the act furnished a standard 
and avoided “arbitrary judgment, whim and caprice,” it was not 
constitutionally deficient. 64 Congress was also allowed to grant power 
to the secretary of labor to take “aliens of certain classes” into custody 
with a warrant because the “background of a declared policy” proved 
“sufficiently definite.”65 Lastly, the Court used such capacious 
formulations as “primary standard” and “general rule” in upholding 
the power of the secretary of war to control bridges for the safe 
navigation of waterways.66  
The pivotal case for nondelegation came in 1928. In J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,67 the government brought suit 
under § 315 of Title III of the Tariff Act of 1922, which allowed the 
president to adjust tariffs to equalize the differences between foreign 
countries.68 The act established guidelines for the president to consider, 
including the differences in production, such as “wages, costs of 
 
 59.  See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386 (1907) (“[Congress] stopped, 
however, with this declaration of a general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty 
of ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule prescribed . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 60.  Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 203–04 (1912). 
 61.  Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912).  
 62.  Id. at 215.  
 63.  Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 245 (1915).  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 36–37, 40 (1924).  
 66.  Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385–86 (1907). 
 67.  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).  
 68.  Id. at 401.  
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material, and other items in costs of production”; the differences in 
selling prices; various foreign policy interests; and “other advantages 
or disadvantages in competition.”69 The Hampton company, subject to 
a higher tariff rate by presidential proclamation, argued that the act 
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of power to the 
president.70 The solicitor general countered that Congress only 
assigned “a fact-finding power” to the president, which presented no 
problem under the current doctrine, and cited a line of cases to support 
the proposition, including The Brig Aurora, Wayman, and Field.71 The 
Court agreed with the United States. So long as Congress prescribed 
“an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix 
such rates [was] directed to conform, such legislative action [was] not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”72 The case bore similarity, 
the Court asserted, to Field, where the president had the duty to 
control reciprocal agreements.73 Later courts would derive the 
intelligible principle test from Hampton, upholding a law if it had an 
“intelligible principle” for the agency to follow.74  
Only in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan75 and A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States76 did the nondelegation doctrine become 
a basis for striking down a statute—the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (“NIRA”). In Panama Refining, the Court considered a challenge 
to § 9(c) of NIRA, the hot oil provision. This provision allowed the 
president to ban the transportation of interstate and foreign commerce 
of petroleum and petroleum products when in excess of the amounted 
permitted by state law or under regulation by a state agency.77 The 
Court stated that though Congress had the “necessary resources of 
flexibility and practicality,” it could not pass legislative power to 
another branch of government.78  
 
 69.  Id. at 401–02.  
 70.  Id. at 395–96, 400.  
 71.  Id. at 398–99.  
 72.  Id. at 409 (emphasis added).  
 73.  Id. at 409–10.  
 74.  See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (using Hampton’s intelligible 
principle test to confirm that “[i]t is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials 
with a specific formula for their guidance” (quoting Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409)).  
 75.  Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
 76.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). For background, 
see generally AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 214–45 (2007) (describing the legal, legislative, and social context behind Schechter). 
 77.  Pan. Refin. Co., 293 U.S. at 406–07. 
 78.  Id. at 421. 
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In Schechter, § 3 of NIRA fared no better, as a unanimous Court 
determined that it also constituted an impermissible delegation of 
legislative authority for similar reasons as § 9(c). NIRA granted the 
president or trade groups, as approved by the president, the power to 
establish “codes of fair competition,” so long as the codes imposed no 
inequitable restrictions on membership to the groups, did not promote 
monopolies, and did not hurt small businesses.79 The Live Poultry Code 
was promulgated pursuant to NIRA, and the Schechters were 
convicted for violating eighteen counts of the code.80 In siding with the 
Schechters, the Court examined whether the term “codes of fair 
competition” sufficiently limited the scope of authority.81 NIRA never 
specified a definition for “codes of fair competition,” and neither the 
common law concept of “unfair competition” nor a similar statutory 
term in the Federal Trade Commission Act could be read into the 
statute.82 The stated goal of NIRA, to effectuate certain policy 
objectives,83 provided too much discretion to the executive.84  
As quickly as the doctrine sprouted to life, it withered.85 For 
nondelegation, the Court kept its broader formulation of delegable 
functions but returned to underenforcing the principle, even as 
Congress conveyed more and more power to agencies. In Currin v. 
Wallace,86 the Court examined the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, 
 
 79.  Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521–22. 
 80.  Id. at 519, 22. 
 81.  Id. at 519, 521–25. 
 82.  Id. at 530–32. 
 83.  Id. at 531 n.9.  
 84.  Id. at 538–39.  
 85.  Following Roosevelt’s court-packing attempt in 1937, a constitutional law revolution 
occurred. Cf. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 120–46 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 6th ed. 2016) (contextualizing the constitutional revolution within the general 
change in jurisprudence around World War II).  See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, 
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001) (debating the effects of 
the revolution in the new century). With the revolution came major changes in other doctrines, 
most famously to the Commerce Clause, and the end of heightened scrutiny for certain economic 
liberties under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) 
(holding that Congress may regulate activity “if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce” regardless of whether it is “direct” or “indirect”); United States v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (finding that “the prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods 
produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority 
of Congress”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that 
Congress may regulate intrastate activities “if they have such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from 
burdens and obstructions”). 
 86.  Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939). 
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which authorized the secretary of agriculture to establish standards of 
tobacco and designate markets where it could be purchased and sold.87 
Though facially similar to NIRA, the Tobacco Inspection Act was a 
permissible delegation of power.88 Similarly, the newly enacted 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which granted the secretary of 
agriculture the ability to fix a quota for crop production and allotment 
among states and farms, had enough “specified factors” to “protect 
against arbitrary action.”89 The comparable Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 1937 required the secretary of agriculture to fix and 
equalize the prices to be paid to producers for milk. It created no 
issue.90 The purpose of the act, “to establish and maintain such orderly 
marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate 
commerce,” gave sufficient guidance to the secretary.91 Even powers 
granted to a committee of private industry citizens, soundly rejected in 
Schechter, encountered no resistance.92 It was constitutional for such 
committees to simply gather facts given that Congress could rely on 
experts to determine social and economic conditions.93  
In the immediate post-1937 case law, the Court universally 
approved broad delegations of power, but not usually with a clear 
formulation of how to approach the problem. The Court continued to 
cite Hampton, even though the words “intelligible principle” appeared 
only intermittently.94 Critics of the intelligible principle test understand 
this lack of consistency as evidence that the Hampton Court never 
intended that the intelligible principle test would become the 
doctrine.95 But this distinction is somewhat of a red herring. For several 
 
 87.  Id. at 1. 
 88.  Id. at 15–18. 
 89.  Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1939). 
 90.  United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939).  
 91.  Id. at 575–76.  
 92.  Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of the Wage and Hour Div. of the Dep’t of Lab., 312 
U.S. 126, 135–36, 142–44 (1941). The fact that “boards as fact-finding agencies” comprised of 
citizens could develop congressional policy in pursuit of a statutory standard resembles a sub 
silentio overruling of Schechter. Id. at 144.  
 93.  Id. at 145–46. 
 94.  See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (holding that delegation of 
congressional power is valid so long as the prescribed standards are “sufficiently definite and 
precise” to determine “whether the will of Congress has been obeyed”).  
 95.  See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]t 
seems plain enough that [Chief Justice Taft] sought only to explain the operation of these 
traditional tests; he gave no hint of a wish to overrule or revise them.”); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n 
of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 81–82 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The analysis in Field and J.W. 
Hampton may have been premised on an incorrect assessment of the statutes . . . . To the extent 
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decades, the Court never adopted clear language, using different 
phrasing each time.96 There was often a coupling of some “guiding 
principle” with a need to “fill up the details.” The ideas mirrored two 
sides of the same issue. When a statute outlined an intelligible 
principle, the agency, of course, had to fill in the details in accordance 
with that principle. When an agency had to “fill up the details,” it did 
so pursuant to the standard of the law. It is a different matter entirely 
to suggest that the word “detail” carried significant weight, such that it 
differed from policy altogether.  
Eventually, later cases would clearly embrace and faithfully 
employ the intelligible principle test.97 If the statute had an intelligible 
principle to guide agency discretion, then it passed muster. As for 
Panama Refining and Schechter, while never repudiated, they have 
effectively become a dead letter—a symbolic check that courts have 
mentioned but never given full consideration, no matter how similar 
the scrutinized law was to NIRA.98 
More recently, the pattern of upholding broad delegations has 
continued, even as opponents of current nondelegation jurisprudence 
have emerged. In Mistretta v. United States,99 the Court examined the 
power of the Sentencing Commission, promulgated pursuant to the 
 
our modern jurisprudence treats them as sanctioning the ‘delegation’ of such power, it 
misunderstands their historical foundations and expands the Court’s holdings.”).  
 96.  See, e.g., Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276 
(1933) (upholding Congress’s delegation of power to the Federal Radio Commission “to exercise 
the administrative judgment essential in applying legislative standards to a host of instances”); 
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“The proviso does not 
delegate legislative power but confers administrative functions entirely valid within principles 
established by numerous decisions of this court . . . .”).  
 97.  See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (referring with approval to 
the choice to “leav[e] to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within 
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature 
is to apply” (quoting Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935))). 
 98.  For examples of later cases upholding laws like NIRA, see Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 
1, 6 (1939) (finding constitutional the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, which authorized the 
“Secretary of Agriculture . . . to investigate the handling, inspection and marketing of tobacco 
and to establish standards by which its type, grade, size, condition, or other characteristics may be 
determined”); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 F. 
Supp. 737, 762 (D.D.C. 1971) (“Given a legislative enactment, there have not been any Supreme 
Court rulings holding statutes unconstitutional for excessive delegation of legislative power since 
the Panama Refining and Schechter cases invalidated provisions of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933.” (emphasis added)); see also Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the 
Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 839 n.214 
(1997) (“The Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since the New Deal. 
Instead, the Court has upheld a variety of open-ended statutes over nondelegation challenges.”). 
 99.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).  
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, to issue then-binding guidelines that 
applied to all persons convicted in the federal court system.100 Despite 
the Commission’s immense authority, the eight-Justice majority found 
the act had prescribed a sufficient intelligible principle to constrain its 
power.101 Only Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed.102  
Justice Scalia, though, later wrote the unanimous opinion of the 
Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns103 upholding a broad 
grant of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”).104 Under § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA must set 
primary ambient air quality standards to “protect the public health 
with an adequate margin of safety.”105 When construed to avoid using 
a cost-benefit analysis, the standard had no constitutional deficiency.106 
It did not differ significantly from past precedent, Scalia observed.107 
From Mistretta to Gundy, the Court, either unanimously or with only 
one dissent, upheld broad delegations to the secretary of 
transportation to “establish a schedule of fees” for all “persons 
operating” pipeline facilities,108 to the attorney general to establish 
categories of criminal conduct for different drugs,109 and to the 
president to “restrict the death sentence to murders in which certain 
aggravating circumstances have been established.”110  
 
 100.  Id. at 367–68. 
 101.  Id. at 379.  
 102.  He emphasized that nondelegation had thus far focused on “the degree of generality 
contained in the authorization,” but the powers of the Commission pertained to legislative 
functions, thus constituting an impermissible delegation of power. Id. at 419–20 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
 103.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 457 (2001).  
 104.  Id. at 465.  
 105.  Id. at 476.  
 106.  See id. at 471 (“The text of § 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context 
and with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost 
considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the 
EPA.”). 
 107.  See id. at 473–74 (comparing the “limits on the EPA’s discretion . . . to the ones 
approved in Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991)” and to the provision of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 “which the Court upheld in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute, 488 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)”).  
 108.  Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 214 (1989).  
 109.  Touby, 500 U.S. at 162. The Court notes:  
The [Controlled Substance] Act establishes five categories or “schedules” of controlled 
substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or 
prohibits . . . . [Section] 201(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to add or 
remove substances, or to move a substance from one schedule to another.  
Id.  
 110.  Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 769 (1996).  
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C. New Proposals 
Over the past fifty years, several groups have unsuccessfully 
advocated to revive the nondelegation principle. Interestingly, the first 
efforts came not from the Supreme Court but from academics, who 
postulated that the unchecked ability of Congress to delegate was 
undemocratic.111 Scholar John Hart Ely delivered a forceful critique. 
He argued that the vast majority of legislating comes from “faceless 
bureaucrats” that “[were] neither elected nor reelected.”112 For the 
really “hard issues,” representatives “shrewdly prefer[red] not to have 
to stand up and be counted but rather to let some executive-branch 
bureaucrat . . . take the inevitable political heat.”113 Such a system, 
condoned by the Supreme Court, eroded people’s faith in 
democracy.114  
Eventually, the scholarly frustration resonated with members of 
the Supreme Court. Although writing only in concurrence or dissent, 
then-associate Justice William Rehnquist led the push, first in 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute (Benzene),115 then again in American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute v. Donovan (Cotton Dust).116 He, not Justice Gorsuch, was the 
 
 111.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 132 (1980) (“[B]y refusing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the sort of 
accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic.”); JAMES O. 
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 93 (1978) (“[A] principal office of the nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that 
controverted issues of policy and opinion be resolved . . . by those who draw their special 
character from a representative relationship to the people.”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 131 (1969) (“Much fun has been 
made of the myth the courts tried to create, that agencies were merely ‘filling in the details’ of 
Acts of Congress.”); Bernard Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, 
the Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1977) (“[I]n the absence of 
meaningful standards, administrative discretion is left completely at large.”); Richard B. Stewart, 
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1672 (1975) (“These 
principles [of democratic government] would, however, be deprived of all practical significance 
were the legislature permitted to delegate its lawmaking power in gross.”); J. Skelly Wright, 
Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 583 (1972) (“[T]he delegation doctrine retains an 
important potential as a check on the exercise of unbounded, standardless discretion by 
administrative agencies.”). 
 112.  ELY, supra note 111, at 131. 
 113.  Id. at 132 (internal quotations omitted).  
 114.  Id.; see also id. at 134 (“If we can just get our legislators to legislate we’ll be able to 
understand their goals well enough. I’m not saying we may not still end up with a fair number of 
clowns as representatives, but at least then it will be because clowns are what we deserve.”).  
 115.  Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 116.  Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490 (1981).  
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first Justice to propose a new test for nondelegation, though the test 
never gained enough support to form a majority.117  
Both the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases involved provisions of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The actual statutory text has 
been described as “a mass of confused and conflicting language.”118 In 
Benzene, Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence focused on § 6(b)(5) of the 
act that enabled the secretary of labor to establish standards for “toxic 
materials or harmful physical agents . . . to the extent feasible,” so that 
no employee would be harmed by regular exposure.119 Unlike the 
Court’s previous nondelegation opinions, Justice Rehnquist began 
with a discussion of constitutional principles.120 He based his 
understanding in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government, 
where Locke wrote that the legislative power cannot be transferred to 
another authority.121 After using Locke to frame the historical basis for 
his view, Rehnquist formulated the “important functions” of 
nondelegation that each law must pass: (1) it must be consistent with 
“orderly governmental administration” ensuring “important choices of 
social policy are made by Congress”; (2) the recipient of the authority 
must be guided by an intelligible principle; and (3) courts must be able 
to meaningfully review if an agency has exceeded that standard.122 In 
announcing his test, Rehnquist did not jettison the intelligible principle 
test. He merely added to its requirements.  
As applied in Benzene, the grant to the secretary of labor failed on 
each count.123 The decision as to which regulations should be enacted 
was a legislative policy choice.124 The feasibility standard had no 
guiding principle, and the word “feasibility” left the courts without 
 
 117.  See Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, The Separation of Powers, 
and the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (noting that although Justice 
Rehnquist was never in the majority, he “attempted to use the nondelegation doctrine to hold 
Congress’s ‘feet to the fire’ by forcing Congress to be conscientious”).  
 118.  KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 2.6 (6th ed. 2018).  
 119.  Benzene, 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) 
(2018)). 
 120.  See id. at 672–73 (invoking John Locke, the Framers, and the Federalist Papers). Later, 
Justice Gorsuch adopted a similar opening in his dissent in Gundy. See Gundy v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–35 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (referring to the Framers, Chief Justice 
Marshall, and John Locke).  
 121.  Benzene, 448 U.S. at 672–73 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  
 122.  Id. at 685–86. 
 123.  Id. at 686. 
 124.  Id.  
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meaningful judicial review.125 Rehnquist applied the same test in his 
dissenting opinion for a similar case a year later, Cotton Dust, reaching 
the same conclusion.126 Ultimately, in both Benzene and Cotton Dust, 
the majority decided the case on grounds other than nondelegation,127 
though the majority in Benzene based its reading, in part, on 
constitutional concerns.128 In Cotton Dust, Rehnquist convinced Chief 
Justice Burger to join his reasoning,129 and the ultimate majority had 
only a bare five votes.130  
The fractured votes, invocation of nondelegation, and forceful 
presentation by Justice Rehnquist ostensibly presaged a revival of the 
nondelegation principle.131 At least for the next thirty-five years, such 
predications were wrong.132 Rehnquist’s three-part test never found 
majority support, and the Court routinely upheld broad grants of 
power to agencies.133 Justice Rehnquist found himself instead agreeing 
with the intelligible principle concept.134  
Before his confirmation, then-Judge Gorsuch assessed the 
constitutionality of the same statute involved in Gundy, explained 
below, and he raised similar concerns about nondelegation in his 
dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc.135 Though in a less-
 
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 543–48 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 127.  See id. at 508–09 (majority opinion) (holding that the delegating statute only precluded 
agency adoption of a health-based rule absent a finding of “feasibility”); Benzene, 448 U.S. at 
614–15 (holding that the delegating statute precluded agency adoption of a health-based rule 
absent a finding that the pre-existing situation created a “a significant health risk”); see also 
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 118, § 2.6 (discussing the holdings of Benzene and Cotton Dust). 
 128.  Benzene, 448 U.S. at 646 (“If the Government were correct . . . the statute would make 
such a ‘sweeping delegation of legislative power’ that it might be unconstitutional . . . .”).  
 129.  Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 130.  Id. at 492 (majority opinion).  
 131.  HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 118, § 2.6 (“Benzene and Cotton Dust seemed to 
foreshadow increased Supreme Court reliance on some version of the nondelegation doctrine.”).  
 132.  Id. (“Since 1989, however, the Court has upheld five broad delegations of power—one 
to an independent agency, two to executive agencies, one to the Attorney General and one to the 
President.”). 
 133.  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (“Statutes need not 
provide a determinate criterion for saying how much of a regulated harm is too much to avoid 
delegating legislative power.”).  
 134.  See id. at 472 (joining Part III of the majority opinion reaffirming the intelligible 
principle test). 
 135.  See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There’s ample evidence, too, that the framers of 
the Constitution thought the compartmentalization of legislative power not just a tool of good 
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developed manner, Gorsuch pushed for a stronger application of the 
nondelegation doctrine. He drew a contrast between “most traditional 
delegation tests” and the recent intelligible principle test that the Court 
adopted.136 A delegation “run riot,” he explained, was “inimical to the 
people’s liberty and our constitutional design.”137 Still a circuit judge, 
Gorsuch could do little to change binding precedent—until he was 
elevated to the Supreme Court, where he would refine his position into 
a more concrete proposal.  
II.  GUNDY V. UNITED STATES 
The statute at issue in Gundy was the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (“SORNA”).138 Throughout the case, both the 
government and the defendant focused on whether the disputed 
provision of SORNA had an intelligible principle. At no point did 
either the parties or any Justice suggest adopting a new framework for 
applying the nondelegation doctrine. That issue was not briefed, except 
by one amicus,139 and was never debated in oral argument. 
Nonetheless, Justice Gorsuch offered a new test for assessing 
nondelegation.  
A. The Gundy Case 
Congress enacted SORNA as part of a growing federal 
intervention into policing sex crimes, which was previously the purview 
of the states.140 SORNA expanded existing registration requirements 
for sex offenders.141 Now, under SORNA, a sex offender must register 
 
government or necessary to protect the authority of Congress from encroachment by the 
Executive but essential to the preservation of the people’s liberty.”).  
 136.  Id. at 672.  
 137.  Id. at 677.  
 138.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019). 
 139.  See infra note 176 and accompanying text.  
 140.  See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (explaining that every state and the District of Columbia 
had a sex offender registration statute but the statutes “varied along many dimensions” before 
SORNA). 
 141.  Id. (“SORNA makes ‘more uniform and effective’ the prior ‘patchwork’ of sex-offender 
registration systems. The Act’s express ‘purpose’ is to ‘protect the public’ . . . by ‘establish[ing] a 
comprehensive national system for [their] registration.’” (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 435 (2012); then quoting 34 U.S.C. 
§ 20901 (2018)). 
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in every state where he lives, is a student, or is an employee.142 The 
registration system has two main provisions. Subsection (b) provides 
the “general rule.”143 If a sex offender is in prison, that person must 
register before completing his sentence.144 If the individual is not 
incarcerated, then he must register within three days of being 
sentenced.145 Subsection (b) affects only offenders sentenced after the 
passage of SORNA, the “post-Act offenders.”146 Subsection (d) 
catches all those not included above. It states:  
  The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the 
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders 
convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation 
in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration 
of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders 
who are unable to comply with subsection (b).147 
Subsection (d) was intended to cover the “pre-Act offenders,” some 
500,000 people.148 Pursuant to SORNA, the attorney general 
established a rule to apply the registration requirements to the pre-Act 
offenders.149  
On October 3, 2005, Herman Gundy entered an Alford plea in 
Maryland state court for a second-degree sexual offense.150 He was 
sentenced to twenty years in prison and five years of probation, with 
ten of the twenty years suspended.151 Later, Gundy confessed to 
violating his federal supervised release.152 He received a two-year 
prison sentence to be served directly after his Maryland sentence for 
his sexual offense.153 Eventually, Gundy was moved to a reentry facility 
in the Bronx, and he was released in 2012, becoming a resident of the 
 
 142.  34 U.S.C. § 20913(a) (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, 
in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the 
offender is a student.”).  
 143.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 147.  34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).  
 148.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122, 2143.  
 149.  Id. at 2122.  
 150.  United States v. Gundy, No. 13 Crim. 8, 2013 WL 2247147, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d 
804 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019); see also Brief for Petitioner at 13, Gundy, 
139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  
 151.  Gundy, 2013 WL 2247147, at *1. 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id.  
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state.154 Afterward, Gundy continued to live in New York but failed to 
register as a sex offender under SORNA.155 The U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Southern District of New York brought charges against him 
soon thereafter.156  
As Professor Jennifer Mascott has noted, Gundy was “unusual” 
from the beginning.157 Gundy was represented by a public defender.158 
The petition for certiorari raised four questions, totaled only twenty 
pages, and dedicated a mere two pages to whether SORNA involved 
an unconstitutional delegation.159 There was no circuit split.160 In fact, 
eleven courts of appeals had rejected similar claims.161 The Supreme 
Court had also declined fifteen times to review SORNA nondelegation 
claims.162 It had addressed the exact same provision in Reynolds v. 
United States,163 albeit answering a different question.164 At first, the 
solicitor general’s office did not even file a brief opposing certiorari, 
only doing so once instructed.165 Still, the then nine-member Court 
 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122 (“After his release from prison in 2012, Gundy came to live in 
New York. But he never registered there as a sex offender. A few years later, he was convicted 
for failing to register, in violation of § 2250.”). 
 156.  Gundy, 2013 WL 2247147, at *1. 
 157.  See Mascott, supra note 23, at 8 (“From the start, this case had a relatively unusual 
posture for a case in which the Court would eventually grant review.”).  
 158.  Id. (“[R]ather than a case involving a well-known corporate entity, a state, or a federal 
actor or a case with clients represented by a well-known Supreme Court litigator, Gundy 
petitioned in forma pauperis represented by a local public defender.”).  
 159.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 1–20 (No. 17-6086); see also 
Mascott, supra note 23, at 8 (“Gundy initially petitioned for certiorari review on four separate 
questions, the fourth of which was his nondelegation claim.”).  
 160.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122 (“The District Court and Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit rejected that claim, as had every other court (including eleven Courts of Appeals) to 
consider the issue.”). 
 161.  See Mascott, supra note 23, at 12 (“[T]he [Brief in Opposition] cited eleven courts of 
appeals that had rejected such claims.”). 
 162.  See id. at 12–13 (“The next page of the [Brief in Opposition’s] argument included a string 
citation to fifteen occasions on which the Supreme Court had denied certiorari review to SORNA 
nondelegation claims.”).  
 163.  Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012). 
 164.  Id. at 436, 439; see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (“This is not the first time this Court 
has had to interpret § 20913(d). In Reynolds, the Court considered whether SORNA’s registration 
requirements applied of their own force to pre-Act offenders or instead applied only once the 
Attorney General said they did.”).  
 165.  Mascott, supra note 23, at 8.  
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granted the writ of certiorari on March 5, 2018 as to whether SORNA 
impermissibly delegated power to the attorney general.166  
After the Court agreed to hear the case, petitioners, respondents, 
and thirteen amici filed briefs.167 Gundy stressed that the restraints 
imposed by the nondelegation doctrine should be particularly 
restrictive in the criminal context.168 He claimed that SORNA failed 
the intelligible principle test by neglecting to provide a standard for the 
policy.169 The government argued that Congress did not violate the 
nondelegation principle, as it supplied an intelligible principle by 
making the attorney general register the pre-Act offenders “to the 
maximum extent feasible.”170 All the amici who filed briefs supported 
Gundy,171 including, to name a few, the Cato Institute,172 the National 
Association of Federal Defenders,173 the American Civil Liberties 
Union,174 and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.175 Of all the amici, 
 
 166.  United States v. Gundy, 804 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 86 U.S.L.W. 3438 
(U.S. Mar. 5, 2018) (No. 17-6086).  
 167.  Mascott, supra note 23, at 7. 
 168.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 150, at 17–23. Repeatedly, Gundy emphasized the 
criminal nature of SORNA in the hopes that the Court would account for the liberty interest in 
the nondelegation context. Whether the doctrine applies differently in the criminal context 
remained unclear at the time of his brief and remains so today. See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 5 n.9) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that no prior scholarship “has 
addressed specifically how the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine apply to criminal 
laws”). In an earlier opinion on SORNA while a judge on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch 
made a similar point:  
  It’s easy enough to see why a stricter rule would apply in the criminal arena. The 
criminal conviction and sentence represent the ultimate intrusions on personal liberty 
and carry with them the stigma of the community’s collective condemnation—
something quite different than holding someone liable for a money judgment . . . .  
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672–73 (10th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). Ultimately, Justice Gorsuch did not pick up this thread when 
dissenting in Gundy. See Hessick & Hessick, supra, at 5 (“[N]one of the justices in Gundy 
grappled with [the criminal law delegation] issues.”).  
 169.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 150, at 23.  
 170.  Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17-
6086) [hereinafter Brief for United States].  
 171.  Mascott, supra note 23, at 7.  
 172.  Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, Gundy, 
139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086). 
 173.  Brief for the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
the Petitioner, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086). 
 174.  Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting the 
Petitioner, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086). 
 175.  Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting the 
Petitioner, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086). 
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only the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence advocated replacing 
the intelligible principle test.176  
The Court heard oral argument for the case on October 2, 2018 
with only eight Justices on the bench.177 Soon-to-be-Justice Kavanaugh 
would be confirmed four days later.178 If there was seemingly little 
appetite to unsettle doctrine in the petition and amici filings, that only 
continued at oral argument. The members of the Court gave little 
indication that they were considering adopting a new test.  
Sarah Baumgartel, counsel for Gundy, never contended that the 
intelligible principle test insufficiently enforced the nondelegation 
doctrine. Rather, from the beginning, she posited that the “lack of 
standard” altogether doomed SORNA.179 She met quick resistance, 
beginning with Chief Justice Roberts, who noted that the government 
claimed to have a standard that satisfied the intelligible principle test.180 
The intelligible principle was to “apply the . . . requirements in the law 
to the maximum extent feasible.”181 Justice Sonia Sotomayor extracted 
a concession: the Court had routinely read statutory limitations to 
avoid constitutionality problems.182 Baumgartel then admitted, after 
further questioning from Justice Kagan, that § 20913(d), if read with a 
feasibility standard, would likely not pose any constitutional issues.183 
Thus, Gundy’s argument necessitated reading SORNA to allow the 
attorney general complete discretion to register or not register the 
500,000 possible offenders.  
Principal Deputy Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall argued on behalf 
of the government. Wall stated unequivocally that the attorney general 
could only make judgments as to the requirements of SORNA based 
on feasibility, not some other policy judgment.184 Even if the Court 
doubted the argument, Wall claimed, it should still construe the statute 
 
 176.  See Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
the Petitioner at 10, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) (“The ‘intelligible principle’ doctrine 
has failed if it was meant as a check against an unconstitutional delegation . . . . This Court should 
instead require Congress to enact judicially manageable guidelines to govern the scope of any 
delegations of authority.”).  
 177.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 178.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 3–4.  
 180.  Id. at 4.  
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id. at 22.  
 183.  Id. at 24–25.  
 184.  Id. at 42.  
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narrowly to avoid the constitutional problem.185 Several Justices asked 
about reading limiting language into the statute to save it from a 
constitutional challenge.186 And that is exactly what the plurality 
opinion did.  
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, wrote for the plurality.187 The Court faced, 
in the eyes of the plurality, two different readings of the statute: to give 
complete discretion to the attorney general over when or if to apply 
the SORNA requirements to pre-Act offenders or, alternatively, to 
mandate the attorney general to apply the SORNA requirements as 
soon as possible, to the extent feasible.188 The text, structure, purpose, 
and legislative history of § 20913(d) demonstrated that the attorney 
general only had the power to adjust the registration requirements for 
pre-Act offenders as needed for feasibility.189 He could not issue a 
categorical excusal for some or all individuals. In light of the numerous 
delegations with even broader standards the Court had sustained over 
the years, the plurality easily answered the question of SORNA’s 
constitutionality.190 If “SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional,” the 
plurality concluded, then so was “most of Government.”191  
Justice Alito cast the deciding vote in Gundy, voting to affirm 
without joining the plurality’s analysis.192 He reasoned that the statute 
did have a discernable standard based on current doctrine.193 However, 
he was amenable to changing the Court’s approach to nondelegation, 
which has been untouched for eighty-four years, provided that a 
majority of the Court could support a single approach.194 Otherwise, “it 
 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  During oral argument Justice Sotomayor asked Baumgartel “why is the reading in a 
feasibility here so unusual, given . . . [the Court has] routinely . . . read into delegation cases 
limits[?]” Id. at 22. Similarly, Justice Kagan noted there seemed to be “some language in the 
statute that supports the government’s reading” of “some feasibility constraint . . . in the statute 
as long as you’re taking the statute as a whole.” Id. at 10–11. 
 187.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019). 
 188.  Id. at 2123. 
 189.  See id. at 2123–29 (discussing the correct interpretation of § 20913(d)). 
 190.  Id. at 2129.  
 191.  Id. at 2130.  
 192.  Id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 193.  Id. at 2130.  
 194.  Id. at 2131 (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have 
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”).  
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would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special 
treatment.”195  
Given the vote split, many legal commentators agree that the 
nondelegation test faces an uncertain future.196 Although a 
reinvigoration is not guaranteed, the possibility remains strong that the 
Court will revisit and, potentially, apply the Gorsuch test, either in part 
or in whole.  
B. Gorsuch’s Dissent  
As to how to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, Justice 
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, 
authored a dissent, in which he proposed a test that would accomplish 
that goal.197 First, beginning with the statutory analysis, Gorsuch took 
the opposite reading of § 20913(d) of SORNA, finding it gives a blank 
check to the attorney general to impose registration requirements on 
any number of pre-Act offenders, or on none at all.198 This reading 
entailed a “vast” and uncontrolled “breadth of authority.”199 Indeed, 
nothing could be salvaged from the text, structure, purpose statement, 
or legislative history to counter the plain meaning.200 Different 
attorneys general used the authority granted by the statute in varying 
ways.201 The government, in Reynolds, even suggested a similar 
reading.202 
 
 195.  Id.  
 196.  See, e.g., Trevor Burrus, Neil Gorsuch Catches a Hail Mary for the Constitution, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (June 28, 2019, 1:13 PM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/neil-
gorsuch-catches-a-hail-mary-for-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/M3GQ-7ZNP] (arguing that 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion “could eventually roll back decades of executive overreach”); Mila 
Sohoni, Opinion Analysis: Court Refuses to Resurrect Nondelegation Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 20, 2019, 10:32 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-refuses-
to-resurrect-nondelegation-doctrine [https://perma.cc/JG9L-V5ST] (“For the nondelegation 
doctrine, the significance of Gundy lies not in what the Supreme Court did today, but in what the 
dissent and the concurrence portend for tomorrow.”).  
 197.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2136–37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 198.  Id. at 2132. 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See id. at 2146–47 (“And as we have seen, the only part of the statute that speaks to pre-
Act sex offenders—§ 20913(d)—makes plain that they are not automatically subject to all the 
Act’s terms but are left to their fate at the hands of the Attorney General.”).  
 201.  Id. at 2132. 
 202.  See id. (“As the Department of Justice itself has acknowledged, SORNA ‘does not 
require the Attorney General’ to impose registration requirements on pre-Act offenders.” 
(quoting Brief for the United States at 23, Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012) (No. 
10-6549))). 
HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2020  5:16 PM 
2020] THE GORSUCH TEST 201 
Second, after interpreting the statute broadly, Gorsuch moved to 
his nondelegation discussion. He emphasized that the principle of the 
separation of powers was enshrined within the Constitution. 
Legislative power, John Locke wrote, “cannot transfer . . . for it being 
but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it 
over to others.”203 In a nation with unchecked legislative delegations, 
laws would no longer “be few in number,” which would deprive them 
of social legitimacy and risk hurting minority interests.204 A citizen 
could not hold a legislator accountable if that legislator had given her 
legislative authority to another person.205 A power or responsibility 
struggle might ensue between Congress and the executive.206 Each one 
would aim to gain the credit without shouldering the blame for difficult 
decisions.207 Liberty must be cherished, and, in Gorsuch’s eyes, 
nondelegation protects liberty interests.208  
As a result, Gorsuch argued that a Court should only uphold a 
statute if: (1) the agency’s task is to “fill up the details”; (2) the 
application of the statute turns on executive fact-finding; or (3) the 
grant of power involves certain nonlegislative responsibilities.209 First, 
filling up the details requires that Congress itself make the policy 
decision.210 Examples of detail filling include ordering federal courts to 
follow state rules but make alterations, assigning to the Internal 
Revenue Service commissioner the duty to design a tax stamp, and 
granting the secretary of agriculture the ability to adopt rules 
regulating the use of public forests to avoid destruction.211 Second, 
executive fact-finding involves the gathering of factual information by 
either the president or one of his subordinates to decide if a statute 
should apply.212 This could be the state of trade relations or trade 
interference with a foreign power, or whether a bridge might cause 
difficulty with maritime navigation of the East River.213 Finally, 
nonlegislative responsibilities include tasks already within the scope of 
 
 203.  Id. at 2133.  
 204.  Id. at 2135.  
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id.  
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id. at 2136–37.  
 210.  Id. at 2136. 
 211.  Id.  
 212.  Id.  
 213.  Id.  
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the executive power, such as certain “foreign affairs powers” entrusted 
to the president.214 
Applying the three-part test to his reading of § 20913(d), Gorsuch 
found that the act amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power. Admittedly, details “can sometimes be difficult to 
discern,” and Congress can, even under the new test, allow an agency 
to fill up “highly consequential” ones.215 What mattered most in 
Gundy, however, was whether Congress “prescribe[d] the rule 
governing private conduct.”216 Gorsuch speculated that members of 
Congress could not agree on an approach to pre-Act offenders, so it 
delegated that policy choice to the attorney general.217 Such a choice 
was not one of filling up details—rather, it was an exercise of legislative 
authority. Moreover, Congress could have made the statute simply turn 
on executive fact-finding. By perhaps giving criteria to the attorney 
general to investigate, such as the chance of an offender committing 
another crime, Congress might have satisfied the second prong.218 It did 
not. Nor did SORNA touch on “overlapping authority with the 
executive.”219 The “duties and rights” of citizens involved a 
“quintessentially legislative power.”220 Given that the disputed 
provision in SORNA could satisfy no element of the newly created test, 
the dissenters would have struck it down as an unconstitutional 
delegation of power.221 More broadly, three Justices would evaluate all 
future challenges to congressional authority using the Gorsuch test.  
III.  THE GORSUCH TEST IN PERSPECTIVE 
Understanding how Justice Gorsuch’s proposal relates to previous 
nondelegation tests and case law offers clues to its potential impact. 
Undoubtedly, the Gorsuch test, if ever applied, would be the strictest 
form of the nondelegation principle in the past ninety years—maybe 
longer. To begin, Justice Gorsuch adopted the “fill up the details” 
formulation used by the Court during the nineteenth century, in 
 
 214.  Id. at 2137.  
 215.  Id. at 2143.  
 216.  Id.  
 217.  Id. at 2144 (“The statute here also sounds all the alarms the founders left for us. Because 
Congress could not achieve the consensus necessary to resolve the hard problems associated with 
SORNA’s application to pre-Act offenders, it passed the potato to the Attorney General.”). 
 218.  Id. at 2143. 
 219.  Id. at 2143–44.  
 220.  Id. at 2144.  
 221.  Id. at 2143–45. 
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addition to the two other areas he identified. Seemingly, this implies at 
least a broader test than just “fill up the details” alone. But the Court 
never used this nineteenth century test to strike down a statute for 
violating the nondelegation principle using this nineteenth century test. 
Indeed, as detailed above,222 numerous capacious standards survived 
this review. If Justice Gorsuch envisions just applying the test more 
rigorously, then his proposal’s application, even if no different in form, 
would still be more stringent.  
Clearer is Justice Gorsuch’s stance on the intelligible principle 
inquiry. He believed that the Hampton Court never wanted to create 
the intelligible principle test.223 Chief Justice Taft “sought only to 
explain the operation of [certain] traditional tests.”224 The current 
nondelegation doctrine instead “[took] on a life of its own.”225 The 
passing phrase became a standard that virtually no statute has failed. 
To Justice Gorsuch, “This mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ 
remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, in 
history, or even in the decision from which it was plucked.”226 Thus, the 
Court must abandon it. This stance markedly differs from even the 
Panama Refining Court’s reasoning, which did not seek to repudiate 
any previous tests or cases.227 Justice Gorsuch remarked that no one 
believed the phrase would ever become the foundation for the 
nondelegation doctrine.228 He even refused to state whether the statute 
at issue in Hampton would satisfy the “traditional tests” he announced, 
only conceding that a “good argument” could be made on the 
subject.229  
In addition, Justice Gorsuch’s version would more tightly police 
legislative delegation than Justice Rehnquist’s Benzene formulation.230 
Rehnquist argued that the Court must examine whether: (1) the grant 
of power is consistent with “orderly governmental administration,” 
ensuring that “important choices of social policy are made by 
 
 222.  See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.  
 223.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2138–39 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 224.  Id. at 2139.  
 225.  Id.  
 226.  Id.  
 227.  See Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429–30 (1935) (finding limits on the ability of 
Congress to delegate but not overturning any case law or test).  
 228.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 229.  Id.  
 230.  Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 686–87 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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Congress”; (2) the recipient of the authority is guided by an intelligible 
principle; and (3) the recipient of the authority has exceeded that 
standard.231 The intelligible principle standard was still central for 
Justice Rehnquist, who merely supplemented it with a review of 
whether Congress made the general policy considerations and whether 
the recipient of the delegation had acted within the grant of power.232 
Justice Rehnquist did not go so far as to say that the Court should 
engage in an extensive inquiry into whether an administrative rule 
really filled up the details of the statute or enacted major policy. 
Rather, he focused on the idea that “important choices of social policy” 
should be made by the legislature—a less absolutist stance than Justice 
Gorsuch’s prohibition against agencies making any policy 
determinations.233   
Again, in contrast to Justice Rehnquist’s formulation, the Gorsuch 
test would discard the phrase “intelligible principle.”234 Possibly, 
Justice Gorsuch’s antipathy toward the current test is rooted in the 
application of the nondelegation principle, not the word choice itself. 
Alternatively, he might just think that a word choice closer to the 
originalist meaning of the nondelegation principle is the preferred 
route. In any event, Justice Rehnquist, far more so than Justice 
Gorsuch, acknowledged the benefits of delegation by maintaining a 
balance in his proposal with the intelligible principle test.235 Congress 
needs the ability to function efficiently by leaving some things to 
agencies. Thus, Rehnquist implied that there is inherently something 
different in “important” versus routine policy decisions by agencies.236 
Gorsuch does not acknowledge the same distinction.  
Although Justice Gorsuch has not specifically advocated 
overruling any previous case law, it is worth considering whether many 
 
 231.  Id. at 685–86.  
 232.  Id.  
 233.  Compare id. at 685 (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine . . . ensures . . . that important 
choices of social policy are made by Congress.”), with Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]s long as Congress makes the policy decisions . . . it may authorize another 
branch to ‘fill up the details.’”). 
 234.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2138–39 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“No one at the time thought the 
phrase meant to effect some revolution in this Court’s understanding of the Constitution.”).  
 235.  See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 685–86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he doctrine guarantees 
that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of 
that authority with an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion.” 
(citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) and Pan. Refin. Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935))). 
 236.  Id.  
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cases would still be good law under his test. The Court has decided over 
a dozen nondelegation cases since 1935. And each time, it has sustained 
the statutory grant of authority. Justice Gorsuch referred to only four 
nondelegation opinions favorably in his analysis: Touby v. United 
States,237 Loving v. United States,238 Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline 
Co.,239 and State Oil Co. v. Khan.240 Conspicuously absent from his list 
were many of the seminal post-Schechter nondelegation cases: 
Benzene, Cotton Dust, Mistretta, and Whitman.  
The consequences of not explaining how a new test affects old case 
law could be dire. Combined with the sheer number of statutes that use 
a general standard, the lack of clarity in the doctrine could open the 
floodgates to thousands of lawsuits. Additionally, litigants may raise a 
nondelegation issue more frequently.241 Criminals convicted under 
administrative rules established under now-suspect laws might 
hurriedly challenge their sentences. Companies seeking to avoid 
liability or regulation could preemptively dispute the ability of 
regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Federal Reserve, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
Alternatively, they may delay litigation for years, raising challenges to 
each of the statutory provisions that governs the case. Agency actions 
might be chilled. Unable to know if their regulations will be upheld, 
bound by a test without clarity, and without the financial resources to 
fight every lawsuit, administrative bodies may forgo issuing major 
regulations altogether. Although some courts might see “fill up the 
details” as simply a moderately more stringent intelligible principle 
test, doctrinal approaches will likely vary greatly, and there is a 
potential for an uneven application of law based on such factors as the 
size of the court docket, the location of the challenge, and even political 
 
 237.  Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
 238.  Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).  
 239.  Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989).  
 240.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).  
 241.  More work is needed to measure the number of nondelegation challenges simply raised, 
as opposed to the number of nondelegation cases decided, both historically and since the Supreme 
Court issued Gundy. As of June 8, 2020, Westlaw recorded eighty-three citing references to the 
case. Citing References for Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019), WESTLAW (last visited 
June 8, 2020). That seems to be a remarkably high number considering how infrequently these 
challenges were raised. Unfortunately, it is impossible to draw any inferences until empirical 
studies have examined this question. 
HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2020  5:16 PM 
206  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:175 
ideology. Regardless, as in the wake of other dramatic shifts,242 lower 
courts will likely be left perplexed.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
Although many areas of government might be destabilized by 
Justice Gorsuch’s proposal, there are a few examples, identified from 
previous cases, law review articles, and case briefs, that will likely be 
most affected by a change in doctrine. Further, theoretically applying 
the Gorsuch test to two recently decided cases in lower court opinions, 
which used the intelligible principle test, illustrates the difficulty in 
changing nondelegation jurisprudence.  
A. The “Three Hundred Thousand” Problem 
Part of the criticism of Justice Gorsuch’s test can be distilled into 
a simple phrase: “Look before you leap.” There is a looming question 
for the nondelegation doctrine—if you applied the reasoning in Justice 
Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy to other nondelegation challenges, how 
would that affect the countless other statutes with similar phrasing to 
SORNA? At oral argument, Justice Breyer estimated that the number 
of standards as broad as SORNA could be three hundred thousand.243 
Congress has relied on the intelligible principle understanding of the 
nondelegation doctrine for almost a hundred years. Under this 
reliance, Congress has enacted statutes that have shaped American 
lives in large and small ways.  
Justice Breyer drew particular attention in oral argument to laws 
regulating the Securities and Exchange Commission.244 To his point, 
the Commission can promulgate rules controlling the means of a short 
sale “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.”245 But the Commission’s authority extends 
even further to overseeing securities and enforcing any violation of its 
 
 242.  Consider both the outpouring of scholarship and lower court confusion in the wake of 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
See, e.g., William H. J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 474, 474 (2017) (“Ever since Twombly and Iqbal introduced the doctrine of plausibility 
pleading, a cottage industry of legal scholars (including myself) has undertaken to detect [their] 
effects . . . on litigants and case outcomes. Results so far have been equivocal . . . .”).  
 243.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
 244.  Id. at 7 (“What about the most famous regulation, that I think people in this room would 
imagine, Rule 10b-5?”).  
 245.  15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2018) (regulating insider trading 
under the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 78j).  
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rules with steep criminal penalties.246 A strict application of the 
Gorsuch test might render one of the most influential bodies in 
American government powerless. Correspondingly, it could leave 
consumers without certain protections and rob the markets of 
structures deriving from these regulations. The power of the 
Commission does not depend on merely filling up details. It must 
constantly evaluate policy considerations, in the interests of the statute, 
that guide its rulemaking discretion.  
In Gundy, the government and plurality identified a few 
illustrative examples of laws that could be upended if the 
nondelegation doctrine changed.247 Under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, every foreign agent must include a “conspicuous 
statement” of their communications with certain foreign powers.248 The 
attorney general can define a “conspicuous statement,” then prosecute 
and imprison someone for not meeting the definition.249 The Federal 
Reserve Board can decide whether certain restrictions that carry 
criminal penalties apply to forms of credit.250 A change in the policy of 
the Board could alter the status for thousands, all of whom could spend 
time in jail based on an agency definition.  
As for examples from historical cases and scholarship, the Federal 
Trade Commission operates to prevent “unfair methods of 
competition.”251 The Federal Communications Commission can grant 
or deny licenses based on vague standards of “public convenience and 
necessity” or “public interest.”252 The secretary of transportation, 
 
 246.  15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).  
 247.  See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019) (noting at least two statutes that 
delegate feasibility determinations to executive officials); Brief for United States, supra note 170, 
at 45 & nn.10–11 (citing numerous statutes where Congress has delegated to an executive agency 
the determination of whether someone will face criminal liability as well as the “authority to 
prescribe substantive requirements in rules and regulations and has separately made it a crime to 
violate those requirements”). 
 248.  22 U.S.C. §§ 614(b), 618 (2018).  
 249.  Id. § 614(b). 
 250.  15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(3)(B).  
 251.  Id. § 45(a). Indeed, the Schechter Court actually approved the Federal Trade 
Commission when ruling on NIRA. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 504 (1935).  
 252.  See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2018) (“No carrier shall discontinue, reduce, or impair service to 
a community, or part of a community, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from 
the Commission a certificate that neither the present nor future public convenience and necessity 
will be adversely affected thereby . . . .”); id. § 307(a) (“The Commission, if public convenience, 
interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this chapter, shall grant 
to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter.”); id. § 309(a) (“[T]he 
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through the National Highway Transportation and Safety Authority, 
sets standards as “practicable” to “meet the need for motor vehicle 
safety.”253 The Federal Aviation Administration can “take such other 
action, including the modification of safety and security procedures 
and flight deck redesign, as may be necessary to ensure the safety and 
security of the aircraft.”254 In times of economic depression, Congress 
has given emergency power to the president to “issue such orders and 
regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, 
wages, and salaries.”255 Ultimately, it is difficult to argue, using Justice 
Gorsuch’s rationale, that these statutes may not also be impermissible 
delegations.  
B. Uneasy Application  
The confusing nature of the Gorsuch test becomes more apparent 
when used to decide two sample nondelegation challenges, one 
criminal and one civil, in the lower courts.256 The standards 
 
Commission shall determine, in the case of each application filed with it to which § 308 of this title 
applies, whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of 
such application . . . .”); see also Robert L. Pacholski, Note, FCC and Reciprocity: An Examination 
of the Public Interest Standard, 62 TEX. L. REV. 319, 319 (1983) (“Such a broad mandate [granted 
to the Commission] . . . holds the potential for abuses of power through expansive and groundless 
construction of the term ‘public interest.’”). But see Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 
190, 225–26 (1943) (rejecting the claim “that the standard of ‘public interest’ governing the 
exercise of the powers delegated to the Commission by Congress is so vague and indefinite that, 
if it be construed as comprehensively as the words alone permit, the delegation of legislative 
authority is unconstitutional.” Instead, the Court notes that the Commission does not make “mere 
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations”) Id. (quoting 
N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)). 
 253.  49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2018). Although not assessing the delegation, the Court examined 
a standard made pursuant to this authority in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the U.S. v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
 254.  49 U.S.C. § 44903.  
 255.  See The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (formerly 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904).  
 256.  No precise formula was used in selecting these two cases. Rather, the aim was to find 
two that captured representative nondelegation challenges under the intelligible principle test 
within the past twenty years. Some fact patterns were quite lengthy and, as such, did not lend 
themselves to the format of a Note. For more examples of nondelegation challenges that might 
lead to a different outcome under the Gorsuch test, see United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 
1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that “promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of the Federal areas 
known as national parks, monuments, and reservations . . . by such means and measures as 
conform to the fundamental purpose . . . [of] conserve[ing] the scenery” is not too broad under 
constitutional nondelegation standards); United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 455, 459 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Federal Drug Administration’s ability to enact “regulations . . . 
relating to the protection of the public health” meaningfully restrains agency action); U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934, 950–52 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
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promulgated by Congress in both cases were broad, and agencies 
created rules pursuant to those broad standards. The litigants raised 
nondelegation challenges and lost. Under the Gorsuch test, the result 
in each case might have been different—or might not have been. 
Theorizing the application of a different rule demonstrates both the 
lack of clarity with the Gorsuch test and the far-reaching consequences 
of changing nondelegation jurisprudence.  
Every federal criminal law, no matter how seemingly insignificant, 
could be impacted by the Gorsuch test, as demonstrated by United 
States v. Komatsu.257 There, Towaki Komatsu approached a Court 
Security Officer (“CSO”) outside of a courthouse building in New 
York City.258 The CSO was on his way to work.259 Komatsu shouted a 
profanity at the CSO, who returned the insult.260 In response, Komatsu 
charged at him with a pen in his hand.261 The CSO parried the thrust 
and forced Komatsu to the ground.262  
After the incident was reported, Komatsu was charged with 
violating 40 U.S.C. § 1315 and the accompanying federal rule 41 C.F.R. 
§ 102-74.390.263 Section 1315 instructs the secretary of homeland 
security to “prescribe regulations necessary for the protection and 
administration of property owned or occupied by the Federal 
Government.”264 Violators can either be fined, imprisoned for a period 
up to thirty days, or both.265 The secretary then promulgated a rule 
penalizing persons on federal property for behavior that: 
 
(drawing upon text, legislative findings, and purpose to determine that the Spoofing Statute of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Form and Consumer Protection Act of 2012 “provide[s] an 
intelligible principle guiding the [agency’s] conduct”); Rothe Dev. Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 107 F. 
Supp. 3d 183, 188–89, 211–12 (D.D.C. 2015) (ruling that the Small Business Administration’s 
power to “acquire procurement contracts from other government agencies and to award . . . those 
contracts by small businesses ‘whenever [the agency] determines such action is necessary’” to help 
disadvantaged individuals satisfies the intelligible principle test); Def. of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 
F. Supp. 2d 119, 127 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding the power of the Department of Homeland 
Security to build barriers across the border of the United States to “deter illegal crossings”).  
 257.  United States v. Komatsu, No. 18-cr-651, 2019 WL 2358020, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 
2019).  
 258.  Id.  
 259.  Id.  
 260.  Id.  
 261.  Id.  
 262.  Id.  
 263.  Id. at *2. 
 264.  40 U.S.C. § 1315(c) (2018).  
 265.  Id. 
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(a) Creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance;  
(b) Unreasonably obstructs the usual use of entrances, foyers, 
lobbies, corridors, offices, elevators, stairways, or parking 
lots; 
(c) Otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance of official 
duties by Government employees; or  
(d) Prevents the general public from obtaining the 
administrative services provided on the property in a timely 
manner.266  
The government cited parts (a) and (c) in Komatsu’s indictment to 
support its position.267 In turn, the defendant raised numerous 
constitutional objections, including a nondelegation challenge to 
§ 1315.268  
Magistrate Judge Tiscione decided Komatsu only a couple of 
weeks before the Gundy opinion was released, disposing of the 
challenge in one page.269 Under current doctrine, § 1315 has an 
intelligible principle, “the protection and administration of property 
owned or occupied by the Federal Government.”270 Indeed, three other 
courts examining the same issue agreed.271 Because the regulation that 
Komatsu violated was made pursuant to an intelligible principle, it is 
constitutionally sound.  
Under the Gorsuch framework, the case may have been resolved 
against the government. The first prong instructs that an agency can 
only “fill up the details,” with the major policy decision residing with 
Congress. Here, the attorney for the defendant could argue that 
“protection and administration” of government property gives too 
much leeway to the Department of Homeland Security to make 
important policy decisions, thus doing more than “filling up the 
details.” The operative word in the statute is “may,” which is 
permissive, unlike the “shall” in SORNA, which is mandatory. The 
 
 266.  41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390 (2019).  
 267.  See Komatsu, 2019 WL 2358020, at *2 (“The Government cites subsections (a) and (c) 
of the regulation [41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390] in its Second Superseding Information . . . .”); see also 
Second Superseding Misdemeanor Info., at 1, Komatsu, 2019 WL 2358020 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 102-
74.390).  
 268.  See Defendant Towaki Komatsu’s Reply Memorandum in Support of His Pre-trial 
Motions at 6–10, Komatsu, 2019 WL 2358020.  
 269.  Komatsu, 2019 WL, 2358020 at *1. 
 270.  Id. at *5 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018)). 
 271.  Id. at *6.  
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secretary could establish hundreds of rules, tens of rules, or no rules at 
all. She possesses the complete power to prohibit virtually any activity 
in federal government buildings. If the secretary chooses, she could 
allow people to run freely, shout with microphones, hold rallies, or 
harass potential litigants on the way to the courtroom.  
Alternatively, the secretary could impose very stringent 
requirements up to any other constitutional bar. She could ban any 
communication devices, limit the number of times a person can enter a 
building, or decide to impose a fee. The text of the statute is not 
constraining. Like in Gundy, this power also carries the criminal 
penalty of imprisonment. And the secretary’s choice would affect 
millions of visitors to public buildings, many times the number of 
sexual offenders affected by SORNA. Consequently, the secretary is 
arguably making policy decisions, not filling up details, and her choices 
will be the ones visible to the public. If the Gorsuch test prioritizes 
political accountability, then § 1315 allows legislators to circumvent the 
task of setting potentially unpleasant rules in the public sphere. This 
abdication of legislative responsibility would be an unconstitutional 
delegation of power.  
Nor can it be argued that § 1315 involves executive fact-finding or 
nonlegislative responsibilities. The statute does not ask the agency to 
make any factual determinations, such as whether a warring power has 
blocked trading or if a bridge might interfere with commerce. Further, 
rules regulating conduct in government buildings have never been the 
traditional domain of the executive. They do not fall under the 
president’s national-security or foreign-affairs-related powers. 
Therefore, neither the second nor third prongs of the Gorsuch test 
would save this delegation of power from its alleged constitutional 
deficiency.  
Of course, the test can arguably be applied more liberally. The “fill 
up the details” formulation may reach more activities than indicated in 
Gorsuch’s dissent. The government might contend that Congress still 
made the major policy decision to regulate the space around federal 
properties but just needed the secretary to designate what types of 
activities would fall within the statute. It is not clear, however, why that 
same logic would not apply to SORNA. Congress made the decision to 
have some pre-Act offenders included within the statute, and the 
attorney general, under Gorsuch’s reading, had the discretion 
regarding when and how to enroll them. Thus, this example illustrates 
the capacious nature of the “fill up the details” prong. The line between 
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“policy” and “details” can be so easily blurred as to render the 
distinction almost unenforceable.  
A 2008 challenge to a civil statute, in Michigan Gambling 
Opposition v. Kempthorne272 out of the D.C. Circuit, exemplifies how 
the civil side of the judicial system is potentially affected. A small band 
of the Pottawatomi Indians273 living in Michigan wanted land to 
construct a casino.274 The tribe’s size had dwindled after decades of 
harsh federal policy that left most members landless and destitute.275 
The unemployment rate was six times that of the neighboring area, and 
the casino offered a step toward “economic self-sufficiency.”276 After 
obtaining recognition of their tribal status under the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”) and complying with all the formal procedures, the 
tribe and the BIA planned to acquire a trace of land in a rural area of 
Grand Rapids for their casino operation.277 Under § 5 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (“IRA”), the secretary of the interior can “in his 
discretion . . . acquire, through purchase . . . any interest in lands, water 
rights, or surface rights to lands . . . for the purpose of providing land 
for Indians.”278 The Michigan Gambling Opposition argued that  § 5 of 
IRA violated the nondelegation doctrine.279  
A divided panel found that the phrase “for Indians” satisfied the 
intelligible principle test.280 In light of the purpose, structure, and 
legislative history of IRA, in addition to the broad standards approved 
by the Supreme Court, the panel considered it permissible. The 
purpose of IRA was to “rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to 
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of 
oppression.”281 Other parts of IRA help define § 5’s scope. These 
provisions govern tribal trusts, help return lands to the trusts, place 
 
 272.  Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  
 273.  The actual spelling of the Pottawatomi Tribe varies. See CARL WALDMAN, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES 234 (2006) (spelling the tribe’s name as 
“Potawatomi” and noting that “[d]ifferent spellings are preserved in place-names as well as 
historical records”). This Note reproduces the nomenclature used by the D.C. Circuit, the 
“Pottawatomi Indians,” but does not endorse any specific terminology.  
 274.  Mich. Gambling, 525 F.3d at 26. 
 275.  See id. (noting that the tribe’s size dwindled concurrently with broad federal policies 
designed to break up tribal holdings).  
 276.  Id.  
 277.  Id. at 26–27. 
 278.  25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2018).  
 279.  Mich. Gambling, 525 F.3d at 27–28.  
 280.  Id. at 30.  
 281.  Id. at 31 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973)).  
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limits on transfers, and give federal dollars to support economic 
developments.282 Several house and senate reports fortify the 
conclusion that § 5 must be read in light of helping tribes overcome 
“economic and social challenges.”283 The standard “need not be utterly 
unambiguous,” and, thus, the phrase “for Indians” sufficed to guide 
agency discretion.284  
The interpretive method used by the majority in Michigan 
Gambling aligns exactly with the plurality in Gundy and, as such, would 
probably be rejected under Justice Gorsuch’s version of the 
nondelegation doctrine. Both the Gundy plurality and the Michigan 
Gambling panel used the purpose, structure, and legislative history of 
each respective piece of legislation to help discern an intelligible 
principle. Given that Justice Gorsuch rejected that approach, § 5 of 
IRA likely would meet the same fate under his test. Under the Gorsuch 
test, the language could not be saved by turning to the methods of 
statutory interpretation, such as using legislative history and the canon 
of constitutional avoidance. Thus, “for Indians” would be understood 
in its broadest possible sense to allow the secretary of the interior to 
purchase land for whatever possible purpose if it simply went to 
indigenous groups. This expansive reading of the statute would be 
subject to the three-part test proposed by Justice Gorsuch.  
It is unlikely § 5 of IRA would survive a stricter nondelegation 
doctrine. First, buying any land “for Indians” does more than task the 
secretary of the interior with filling up the details. She can buy the land 
for any reason, whether good or bad. One day the purchase might be 
for herding. The next day the purchase might be for an amusement 
park. There are no limits on her discretion of how to buy land, for what 
purpose, and who might be affected. Here, the secretary chose 
gambling, an activity that Congress might not sanction itself given the 
complexities of state law or the possible perception of the practice as a 
moral vice. There may be political fallout from a law that used federal 
tax dollars to buy land for more casinos. But the legislative branch 
avoided these problems by passing the buck to a faceless bureaucrat. 
The statute requires more than filling up details. It needs large 
policymaking.  
Any effort to save this part of the IRA as either “executive fact-
finding” or “overlapping authority with the executive” would not 
 
 282.  Id.  
 283.  Id. at 32.  
 284.  Id. at 33. 
HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2020  5:16 PM 
214  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:175 
succeed.285 The ability to purchase any land does not depend on any 
type of fact, such as the end of a war. The secretary of the interior can 
purchase land irrespective of any conditions. Congress did not impose 
them, and the statute cannot be understood to include any. Purchasing 
land for economic revitalization does not fall within a traditional 
executive area. Section 5 would not be within any prong of the Gorsuch 
test. Of course, like in Komatsu, the government could assert creative 
ways of framing the statute to fit within “fill up the details.” The 
standard “for Indians” could require the secretary to just assign 
particular uses of lands already designated for use. If the reviewing 
court approached the challenge like Justice Gorsuch examined 
SORNA though, the different framing of the issue would not change 
the outcome. Section 5 of the IRA would meet the fate of countless 
other statutes that have relied on decades of the intelligible principle 
test to empower agencies. Both criminal and civil statutes alike would 
have difficulty satisfying Justice Gorsuch’s test.  
CONCLUSION 
The future of nondelegation is unclear. Courts continue to 
examine statutes to determine if they set out an intelligible principle to 
guide agency action. However, with the addition of Justice Kavanaugh, 
at least five Justices have expressed, in one form or another, a desire to 
alter the decades-old intelligible principle standard.  
Against the backdrop of two hundred years of congressional 
reliance and the still-ubiquitous need for Congress to delegate 
efficiently, the choice to consider revitalizing the nondelegation 
principle raises questions. The problem, however, is not just the choice 
to revisit this topic but also the method Justice Gorsuch has suggested. 
The Gorsuch test provides minimal doctrinal clarity. It rests mostly 
upon nineteenth and early twentieth century cases that, at the height 
of judicial scrutiny, did not strike down broad grants of power. 
Problems would abound if a litigator tried to apply the Gorsuch test to 
the potentially hundreds of thousands of laws that resemble the 
standard in SORNA. Moreover, the very structure of power sharing 
between the legislative and executive branches could be upended. If 
the Supreme Court decides to revisit nondelegation, it should be 
 
 285.  See supra notes 209–19 and accompanying text (describing the prongs of the Gorsuch 
test); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2216, 2143–44 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(concluding SORNA failed on the second and third prongs of executive fact-finding and shared 
executive authority, respectively).  
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cognizant of the various problems that will accompany a change in 
jurisprudence. Better yet, the Court should retain the intelligible 
principle test to ensure stability in the law, the government, and the 
court system. 
